

Subj: NAVY EXECUTIVE SAFETY BOARD (NESB) MEETING #3

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
From: Navy Executive Safety Board, Executive Agent

Subj: NAVY EXECUTIVE SAFETY BOARD (NESB) MEETING #3

Encl: (1) Key Issues Discussed
(2) Minutes of the Meeting
(3) Navy Executive Safety Board (NESB) Attendees

1. The third meeting of the Navy Executive Safety Board continued its work to improve upon the Navy's PMV mishaps investigations and a proposed effort to revitalize Operational Risk Management (ORM) throughout the Navy. Short-term and long-term strategies examining private motor vehicle mishap investigations and root cause analysis were presented in an effort to develop effective, corrective actions and intervention strategies in an effort to prevent the needless loss of life due to PMV mishaps. In the area of ORM the group discussed models to help rejuvenate and weave ORM into all aspects of the Navy. More details concerning these important issues are contained in Enclosures 1 and 2. These efforts continue to be the highest priority of the Navy Executive Safety Board.

2. Commands identified for action in Enclosure 1 are directed to begin work and report progress and deliverables to the next Navy Executive Safety Board meeting scheduled for 11 October 2006.


RADM Mayer
COMNAVSAFECEN

Key Issues and Action Tasks

1. Issue: Safety Data Management

Discussion: During the Operations Safety Support committee update, the briefer noted that a Data Management Working Group had been established to determine a single safety management system across the Navy and that a Risk Management Information System (RMIS) assessment was planned for early FY07. VCNO advised that the Data Management Working Group take care to examine other services' data management applications for a possible adaptable software solution.

Action: Ensure that other services' data management applications are considered for possible adaptive software solutions during the RMIS.

Action Agent(s): COMNAVSAFECEN

Due date: 1 Jan 2007

2. Aviation Compliance Tracker

Discussion: During the Operations Safety Committee brief, the briefer noted that they are working on an Aviation Compliance Tracker which is a web-based tool that monitors aviation unit compliance, providing readiness reporting and a quick snapshot of the unit's safety posture. VCNO asked about the training aspects of the tracker and stated the importance of communicating expectations to users of the expected refresh rate and data accuracy and to keep an eye on possible follow-up training issues as this system is introduced.

Action: Ensure that accurate guidance is provided to users of the Aviation compliance tracker so they understand the refresh rate and data accuracy necessary to make this system effective. Additionally, determine what training is required of users before introducing this system.

Action Agent(s): Operations Safety committee.

Due date: 1 Jan 2007.

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3. Operational Risk Management (ORM).

Discussion: The Operations Safety Committee briefed their recommendations for revitalizing OR throughout the Navy. During the course of the brief, a lengthy discussion ensued concluding that the Navy had not yet fully understood the root causes behind the inability to sustain the ORM program and make it a vital part of Navy culture since the first time that it was introduced in 1993. The VCNO directed that determining these root causes was an essential first step before other work was done.

Action: Solicit insights from Commanders regarding ORM shortcomings and barriers to full integration of ORM into the Navy culture. Following this effort, the NESB will identify corrective actions to revitalize ORM. Operations Safety Committee to report its findings at the next NESB Flag Panel meeting.

Action Agent(s): Operations Safety committee (lead). COMNAVSAFECEN, Operations Safety Support committee (OSSC) and Commander, Naval Education and training Command (assist).

Due date: 11 October 2006.

4. Issue: Navy PMV mishaps investigations and root cause analysis

Discussion: Operations Safety Support Committee briefed their efforts to improve root cause analysis of Class A PMV mishaps. Current efforts are focused on deciding which analysis tool is appropriate for investigators to determine the root causes of PMV mishaps. There are currently two pilot programs being run to evaluate the NSC-devised investigation template and the REASON root cause analysis software. Three investigations are planned in each pilot program and one each is currently underway. The committee is also working on changes to the investigation processes, determining thresholds for more detailed investigations and an investigation endorsement process.

Action: Continue the work of the pilot programs, determining thresholds for more detailed investigations and an investigation endorsement process and report findings at the next NESB meeting.

Action Agent(s): Operations Safety Support Committee

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Due date: 11 October 2006.

5. Issue: Identifying high risk personnel and developing effective controls.

Discussion: During the Operations Safety Support committee brief on improving PMV investigations, the NESB identified two additions to our mishap reduction efforts; first, systematically identifying high risk personnel and second, providing Commanders with the necessary tools to control this risk. VCNO noted that during recruitment and boot camp, certain individuals are screened for substance abuse or academic risk, but not necessarily for poor or risky decision making. Those behaviors may show up later as a pattern in individual service records. He added that overseas commanding officers have a greater choice of tools that allow them to restrict personnel from off-base activity if a risk is determined. In CONUS, legal barriers exist for COs to exert the same control. He has raised the issue to MCPON and legal advisors to research exactly what barriers are preventing CONUS COs from stricter controls, and whether or not there needs to be legislation to remove some of these barriers.

Action: Identify examples of successful personnel risk assessment programs that are currently in place and recommend standardization of these programs throughout the Navy. This work shall be accomplished in conjunction with existing Fleet efforts to combat improper off-duty behavioral and disciplinary incidents. Also, in conjunction with the Judge Advocate General, identify existing barriers that prevent Commanders from emplacing controls to better manage the risks associated with the highest risk Sailors after normal working hours. Report progress on this work at the next NESB meeting.

Action Agent(s): Operations Safety committee (lead), Operations Safety Support committee, COMNAVSAFECEN (support).

Due date: 11 October 2006.

4. Issue: Funding of safety initiatives.

Discussion: N8 provided a brief to the NESB outlining how to inject the funding of safety initiatives into the OPNAV process. Initially, they examined the old process of funding, using midyear and sweep-up funds, and found it lacking. They determined that the safety center needed a way to intersect with the enterprise funding process. Concerns were raised that this process was top-down focused and was being proposed for all

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unfunded safety issues. It was discussed that it depends on the urgency and the cost of the requirement to determine how far up the chain of command the requirement travels. The enterprise will often make trades within itself and compromise to fix an issue. If there is no significant urgency, the request goes into the traditional funding process. Additionally addressed, were where safety issues begin and conflict with operational priorities there appears a required tradeoff between the war fighting capability and implementation of a safety system. That sometimes the issue is resolved according to whoever last touches the budget and a process to evaluate safety concerns and war fighting capability come in terms of criticality. The NESB agreed that urgent safety needs require a method to address and adjudicate as to whether the funding is critical enough to disrupt another program. It was requested that this process receive some further attention to ensure that it is not top-down driven and that it appropriately engages the enterprise system.

Action: Revise the proposal and rebrief NESB.

Action Agent(s): OPNAV N8

Due Date: 11 October 2006.

Enclosure (1)

Navy Executive Safety Board
Minutes
15 August 2006

The Navy created the Navy Executive Safety Board (NESB) in accordance with the Secretary of the Navy's Naval Safety Strategy and the Navy Plan of Action and Milestones (POA&M) created to implement that strategy. The NESB is chaired by the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, and its Executive Agent is the Commander, NAVSAFECEN. Its members include MCPON, FFC, PACFLT, CNIC, Naval Air Forces, Naval Surface Forces, Naval Submarine Forces, Naval Expeditionary Combat Command, SPECWARCOM, NETC, NAVAIR, and NAVSEA. DASN(Safety) and Director, HQMC Safety Division are advisors to the Board. The NESB held its third session, chaired by VCNO, Admiral Willard, on 27 June 2006 from 1400-1600. A list of Flag officer and staff attendees is included in a separate enclosure. Briefings and supporting documentation are available at the Naval Safety Center's website.

RADM George Mayer, Commander, NAVSAFECEN, welcomed all attendees. ADM Willard welcomed the group and stated that the reason for reconvening the group sooner rather than later was to maintain an urgent focus on near-term goals, determine root causes, and pursue corrective actions. Once the Board has put its planned procedures in place and achieved some of its goals, meeting timelines may be extended.

Mr. Hank Spolnicki (CNIC) began the presentations with an update on Operations Safety Support Committee actions. The OSSC held a kickoff meeting on 12 June and allocated its Safety Strategy POA&M tasks to the appropriate members on 19 June. Actions were taken in its four focus areas:

1. Traffic Safety/RODS: Convened first working group meeting on 25-26 July, focused on a way-ahead for PMV mishap investigations and root cause analysis.
2. Occupational Safety & Health: Scheduled first meeting for September 06, focused on improving OSH programs to reduce work-related mishaps, particularly ergonomics and fall protection.
3. Training: Scheduled first meeting for October 06, focused on cooperating with the Operations Safety Committee on the Navy Safety Training Continuum.
4. Data Management: The Safety Center was identified as the lead for data management in the FY06 DON Safety Objectives. The working group is focused on determining a single safety management system across the Navy. A contractor will be evaluating existing systems and providing a recommendation.

ADM Willard advised that the Data Management working group take care to examine other services' data management applications for a possible adaptable software solution.

RADM Starling continued by briefing the recent activities of the Operations Safety Committee (OSC), which, to date, has convened one senior-level meeting and two working

group meetings. By 8 September, each working group will have reviewed its POA&M tasks and developed strategies to achieve them. The committee will also decide on recommended actions to complete quick-fix tasks to revitalize already established programs. The working groups will deliver the status of all tasks with a due date within six months. The OSC has four working groups: Operational Risk Management, Safety Training (Joint OSC/OSSC), Acquisition Safety, and Enterprise Lead/TYCOM. The Enterprise working group is currently working on populating an Aviation/Afloat safety best practices webpage. They are also working with the Aviation Compliance Tracker, a web-based tool that monitors aviation unit compliance, providing readiness reporting and a quick snapshot of the unit's safety posture.

ADM Willard asked if the working group had considered the training aspect of the new Compliance tracker. RADM Starling replied that they had, knowing the training issues that had occurred with the rollout of WESS. ADM Willard asked that the committee consider and communicate to the users the expected refresh rate and data accuracy and keep an eye on possible follow-up training issues.

CAPT Neubauer (NAVSAFECEN) followed with a presentation on the OSC working group's proposed effort to revitalize Operational Risk Management (ORM) throughout the Navy. In the area of Leadership and Policy, the group has developed models to help weave ORM into all aspects of the Navy and to serve as the cornerstone of the new OPNAVINST 3500.39C (ORM: Operational and Off-duty Risk Management). The intent is to shift the focus of ORM from the Safety Center to the operational leaders via the Operational Safety Committee. The group recommends periodic ORM-related messages from flag-level leadership, especially emphasizing ORM terms, knowledge of which has been assessed as lacking. They also recommend emphasizing refresher ORM courses on NKO. The updated ORM instruction and manual is planned for release at the end of September.

ADM Willard asked if they had determined exactly why risk management did not gain sufficient "traction" since its introduction to the Navy in 1993. It seems that we are following the same approach and methodology that had failed during the initial roll-out of ORM. He expressed concern that following the same or a similar path for a revitalization effort would also fail if there is no real understanding of why it did not stick the first time. ORM has been considered a mandatory process in certain circumstances for some time now, but it still is treated as an option. He added that he disagreed that it was perceived as a "safety program," because operators do understand risk management. He cautioned that before the group move forward with the revitalization effort, it identifies the root cause of why it's full implementation failed the first time. CAPT Neubauer agreed to begin to ask this specific question during assessments.

VADM Etnyre stated that ORM is considered and incorporated into planning for regular evolutions, but is often overlooked in "on-the-fly" circumstances, where last minute planning is required. Adaptability to changed circumstances or sudden events is not necessarily taught in ORM courses, so Sailors do not have the coaching to implement ORM at those times. ADM Willard suggested that the course materials be reviewed to ensure that that is a concern and correct it.

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Mr. Schulze (NAVSEA) added that often, it is not on-duty ORM implementation that is a problem, but exercising it off-duty, in personal decision-making and that this is a behavioral problem more than a training issue. VADM Conway stated that ORM is not necessarily introduced early enough or emphasized sufficiently to make it self-policing. His concern was that everyone thinks it is “someone else’s issue.”

Mr. Garbow (ODASN(S)) agreed with ADM Willard that ORM was not adequately implemented during its introduction and incorporation into the schoolhouse, and there was a lack of reinforcement. He stated that it should be inserted into all educational coursework. Mr. Rollow (DASN(S)) added that information on ORM utilization is not reaching the deckplate workers at many facilities. He noted that mentoring programs have worked at the deckplate at some activities and recommended that successful mentoring programs be shared among activities.

Mr. Weightman (USMC SD) noted that formalized ORM training may not sink in with young personnel, who are being expected to incorporate it into their off-duty decision-making. A less formal, memorable “stop and think” phrase may be more effective (i.e., “is it going to hurt me or am I going to get in trouble”). ADM Willard agreed that the formal application may be perceived as not adaptable and, consequently, ignored. There needs to be a refocus on the practical application of ORM, and how to make it habitual or second nature.

CAPT Neubauer continued with his presentation by outlining the group’s plan for ORM implementation assessment. This “measurement” piece has been lacking before, so the group has developed a model and tested it during afloat and aviation safety surveys. They have also included personnel from the Human Performance Center to add a psychological perspective. They plan to develop a standard for all assessment units and work on developing an assessment training course. Feedback and monitoring is a natural extension of the assessment process. The group intends to make best practices and lessons learned available via the NSC website and perhaps the online climate survey process. They are also revitalizing the now-stagnant Total Risk Assessment and Control System (TRACS) and working with the Air Force on a joint tool. Finally, the group plans to build standard deliberate risk analyses for recurring Navy evolutions and to make them available to the Fleet.

ADM Willard expressed concern that the final portion of the brief did not offer any answers to the questions that had been raised in discussion, and reemphasized that the focus should be on a distinct output metric and an understanding of what went wrong with ORM implementation the first time and how to correct it. He was not convinced that the current strategy is the right one for successful ORM revitalization and asked to revisit the topic at the next ESB as well.

RADM Mayer agreed that the ORM team had not investigated the root causes behind the failure of ORM implementation and agreed to refocus the effort on that question.

ADM Willard added that there seems to be confusion in the Fleet as to where risk management is considered value-added. It should be emphasized that even where established procedures exist, ORM still applies, since environmental factors are variable. It seems that there is no belief in the value of risk management, and personnel choose to trust the manual or

procedures to the letter. The question is how to get under the skin of the nonbelievers to alter their perception. VADM Crenshaw added that the working group should also examine the cases that worked: Why did NATOPS stick? What are the enduring characteristics? ADM Willard responded that accountability is likely a key factor.

The meeting proceeded with a briefing from Mr. Spolnicki on the actions of the OSSC Traffic Safety/Recreational Off-Duty Safety working group, which has been examining private motor vehicle mishap investigations and root cause analysis. The group has devised both short- and long-term strategies to approach this challenge. The first short-term challenge is to determine which analysis tool is appropriate for investigators to determine the root cause of a mishap. Currently, investigations are being run on two pilot programs, the NSC-devised investigation template and the REASON software used by the aviation community, to determine the effectiveness of each tool. Three investigations per tool are planned, and one each is currently underway on the USS EISENHOWER and USS NEVADA, respectively.

Another short-term strategy is to change investigation processes, establishing an investigation requirement instead of an optional Safety Investigation Board. Also, the group intends to develop an Echelon III/II Flag endorsement process for PMV investigations, which promotes data collection and emphasizes accountability.

Long-term, the working group is investigating preventive and predictive risk management for personnel behavior, identifying individuals with a propensity for risky behavior and developing intervention techniques to mitigate that risk. ADM Willard noted that during recruitment and boot camp, certain individuals are screened for substance abuse or academic risk, but not necessarily for poor or risky decision making. Those behaviors may show up later as a pattern in individual service records. He added that overseas commanding officers have a greater choice of tools that allow them to restrict personnel from off-base activity if a risk is determined. In CONUS, legal barriers exist for COs to exert the same control. He has raised the issue to MCPON and legal advisors to research exactly what barriers are preventing CONUS COs from stricter controls, and whether or not there needs to be legislation to remove some of these barriers. VADM Cosgriff raised the option of a possible "ORM Waiver," similar to waivers issued for those with past problems with drugs, which requires a strict adherence to preset guidelines with very clear consequences for misbehavior. He also emphasized that there be a fair and measurable way for personnel to be placed on a high-risk list or moved off it when conditions merit.

Mr. Garbow noted that the DSOC is pursuing several initiatives to mitigate high-risk behavior, including ramped up IG inspections of command compliance. The DSOC PMV Task Force is also looking to establish a DoD-wide contract with a private company to supply the Department with public record information on personnel driving records, which is information that is now not being shared. They have also contracted with a researcher from Kansas State University to adapt a survey tool that identifies high-risk drivers and proposes appropriate interventions based on the behaviors they exhibit. The pilot program cannot be accelerated from its current schedule.

ADM Willard agreed that those are good ways to try to transform individuals from high- to low-risk, but pointed out that constraining a high-risk individual in the immediate term is another issue. Constraints on behavior are imposed at boot camp and at the Naval Academy but similar options do not exist for Fleet commanders to impose. Past legal rulings have taken away certain disciplinary tools, and Sailors are aware of it. ADM Willard added that the Navy should look at the management of after-hours high-risk behavior as risk management of its entire workforce.

RADM Starling noted that USS THEODORE ROOSEVELT developed a very successful screening program on its way back from deployment, which assigned personnel for more training depending on their behavioral risk assessment. He suggested approaching them for any available data.

ADM Willard agreed and added that RADM Donnelly has experience with these issues, too, at WESTPAC. He suggested that the Fleet, CNIC, and the Safety Center collaborate and devise a way ahead, consulting as well with Navy JAG and PACFLT.

Next, CAPT Bump (N8) provided a presentation on a proposed ESB funding process. N8 was invited to join the ESB and to investigate how to inject safety funding issues into the OPNAV process. Initially, they examined the old process of funding, using midyear and sweep-up funds, and found it lacking. They determined that the Safety Center needed a way to intersect with the Enterprise funding process. The basic proposal is below:

Executive Safety Board Funding Process	
Safety Center identifies a safety related funding issue that cannot be resolved with Safety Center funding.	
①	Safety Center identifies the requirement to the Executive Safety Board (ESB). If the requirement and funding level are approved by the ESB, the requirement is passed to:
② ^a	The Navy Enterprise Board of Directors (NE BOD) to identify Enterprise Domain(s) or Enabler(s) responsible for developing funding options.
or	
② ^b	N8/FMB to develop corporate funding options for Safety issues impacting multiple domains (funding will be derived from multiple domain(s)/ enabler(s))

③ ^a	Options are developed by the Enterprise(s) or Enablers(s)
or	
③ ^b	Options are developed in OPNAV internally

④ ^{a/b}	Enterprise and OPNAV approved funding options will be coordinated with N8/FMB to ensure executability and proper timing.
⑤	N8/FMB notifies Naval Safety Centers of intended solution


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ADM Willard raised a concern that this process was top-down focused and was being proposed for all unfunded safety issues. He asked if this is how unfunded requirements are handled across the enterprise. VADM Cosgriff responded that it depends on the urgency and the

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cost of the requirement to determine how far up the chain of command the requirement travels. The enterprise will often make trades within itself and compromise to fix an issue. If there is no significant urgency, the request goes into the traditional funding process. VADM Zortman added that where the issue begins is when safety and operational priorities conflict and there appears to require a tradeoff between warfighting capability and the implementation of a safety system. He added that sometimes the issue is resolved according to whoever last touches the budget. They do have a process to evaluate safety concerns and warfighting capability in terms of criticality.

ADM Willard stated that he did not support Safety Center unfunded requirements entering the funding process at the Board of Directors level. The BoD is not intended as an entry point, but more as an adjudicator. Mr. Schulze interjected that perhaps a better way to look at it would be for unfunded ideas evaluated by the OSSC/OSC subcommittees and approved by the ESB as investment-worthy to use this process, rather than all unfunded safety issues. VADM Cosgriff also added that it would be important to identify an appellate process to ensure that Safety had a venue to voice concerns about funding. He continued by saying that perhaps there is a scale issue as well, and that the BoD could establish an appropriate priority level for issues that are raised before it.

ADM Willard agreed that urgent safety needs require a way to be addressed and adjudicated as to whether the funding is critical enough to disrupt another program. He requested that this process receive some further attention to ensure that it is not top-down driven and that it appropriately engages the Enterprise system

ADM Willard asked participants for any final comments. Regarding the topic of funding, RADM Starling noted that lack of funding had curtailed some planned aviation cultural workshops earlier in the year. He indicated his support for the ESB to determine a way for NSC to get funding from the Fleet at a single point-of-entry, instead of “passing the cup.”

Returning to the topic of managing risky behavior, RADM Donnelly added that he was very interested in the investigation of legal barriers to constraints on behavior, especially for CONUS/Guam concerns.

VADM Moran indicated that the services of the NPRST (Navy Personnel Research, Studies, and Technology) and the Human Performance Center are available to assist in the ORM work that had been identified during the meeting and stated that he will be in touch with RADM Mayer to discuss.

ADM Willard thanked all participants for their comments. He added that he expected the next meeting within four to six weeks. The meeting adjourned at 1605.

Navy Executive Safety Board
Attendees
15 August 2006

Name	Command	Location
ADM Willard	VCNO	Pentagon
VADM Conway	CNIC	Pentagon
VADM Cosgriff	FltForCom	Pentagon
VADM Crenshaw	OPNAV N8	Pentagon
RADM Enewold	NAVAIR	Pentagon
RADM Mayer	NAVSAFECEN	Pentagon
RDML DeLoach	SUBFOR	Pentagon
RDML Engle	CPF	Pentagon
Mr. Rollow	DASN(S)	Pentagon
Mr. Schulze	NAVSEA	Pentagon
CAPT Bump	OPNAV N8	Pentagon
CAPT Glenn	NAVSAFECEN	Pentagon
CAPT Neubauer	NAVSAFECEN	Pentagon
Col Wenger	HQMC SD	Pentagon
CDR Blackketter	NAVAIR	Pentagon
CDR Hobbs	NAVSAFECEN	Pentagon
CDR Hogan	NAVSAFECEN	Pentagon
Mr Decker	CNIC	Pentagon
Ms Erdman	OPNAV N09FB	Pentagon
Mr Garbow	ODASN(S)	Pentagon
Mr Lewis	NAVSAFECEN	Pentagon
Mr Spolnicki	CNIC	Pentagon
VADM Etnyre	SURFOR	VTC - San Diego
VADM Zortman	CNAF	VTC - San Diego
RADM Bachmann	SPAWAR	VTC - San Diego
CAPT Bonelli	NAVSPECWARCOM	VTC - San Diego
CAPT Heinz	NAVSPECWARCOM	VTC - San Diego
RADM Starling	CNAL	VTC - Norfolk
RADM Stanley	CFFC	VTC - Norfolk
CDR Solberg	FltForCom	VTC - Norfolk
Mr McFarland	SUBFOR	VTC - Norfolk
Mr Myers	FltForCom	VTC - Norfolk
RADM Donnelly	CPF	VTC - Hawaii
CDR Nelson	CPF	VTC - Hawaii
CAPT Yeager	NETC	VTC - Pensacola
VADM Moran	NETC	VTC - Millington
CAPT McKenna	NECC	VTC - Little Creek